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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND WEBB, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, WILLIAM 
REAGAN, individually, 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, 
individually, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROLAND WEBB 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County denying Appellant 
Roland Webb's ("Webb") motion for partial summary judgment and 
granting Respondents R.O.A. General, Inc.'s ("R.O.A.") and 
William Reagan's ("Reagan") cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment. The District Court's order has been certified as a 
final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Appellate 
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
the provisions of R. Utah S. Ct. 3(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in holding, as a matter 
of law, that the mere notice by Respondent R.O.A. of its exercise 
Supreme Court 
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of an option to repurchase stock owned by Webb terminated Webb's 
stock ownership and therefore his right, as a shareholder of 
record, to examine the books and records of R.O.A. pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)? 
2. Was Webb's written demand to examine the books and 
records of R.O.A. in order to verify their accuracy, to evaluate 
the financial condition of R.O.A. and to determine the value of 
his R.O.A. stock, as a matter of law, reasonably related to 
Webb's interest as a shareholder and therefore a proper purpose 
under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)? 
3. Was Webb's request to examine the books and 
records of R.O.A. during regular business hours, as a matter of 
law, a request to examine said books and records at a reasonable 
time? 
4. Is Webb entitled to recover from R.O.A., Reagan, 
president of R.O.A., and Douglas Hall ("Hall"), legal counsel to 
R.O.A., the statutory penalty for each of their respective 
separate refusals to permit Webb to examine the books and records 
of R.O.A. in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c)? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)-(c) (1986): 
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of record, 
upon written demand stating the purpose* thereof, shall 
have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or 
attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any 
proper purpose, its books and records of account, 
minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts 
therefrom. A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably 
related to the person/s interest as a shareholder. 
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation 
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or 
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his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts 
from its books and records of account, minutes, and 
record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall 
be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of 
the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in 
addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by 
law; but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall 
be a defense to any action for penalties under this 
section that the person suing therefor has within two 
years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders 
of such corporation or any other corporation or has 
aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of 
shareholders for any such purpose, or has improperly 
used any information secured through any prior 
examination of the books and records of account, or 
minutes, or record of shareholders of such corporation 
or any other corporation, or was not acting in good 
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand, 
(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) (1986): 
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a holder of 
record of shares in a corporation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c): 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed 
for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of 
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action by Webb to compel R.O.A. and Reagan 
to allow Webb to examine the books and records of account of 
R.O.A. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and to recover 
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the statutory penalties imposed under § 16-10-47(c) for each 
refusal by R.O.A., Reagan and Hall to allow such examination. 
Disposition in the District Court 
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, which judgment 
granted R.O.A.'s and Reagan's motions for partial summary 
judgment, and held that because R.O.A. gave notice of exercise of 
its option to repurchase Webb's shares in R.O.A., Webb ceased to 
be a shareholder of R.O.A. and therefore has no right to examine 
the books and records of R.O.A. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10-47(b). The rulings of this partial summary judgment are 
contained in the District Court's minute order dated July 21, 
1987, (R. at 290-291), and formal order dated August 7, 1987, (R. 
at 313-315). The District Court's August 7, 1987 order has been 
certified by the District Court as a final judgment pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), as reflected in the District Court's 
minute order dated September 1, 1987, (R. at 352), and formal 
order dated September 28, 1987, (R. at 377-378). 
Statement of Facts 
By written agreement dated July 7, 1981, Webb and 
Reagan formed R.O.A., a Utah corporation. (R. at 62-78, 483-
484). Reagan obtained 80% of the stock of R.O.A. and Webb and 
his wife acquired the remaining 20% stock interest (the "Webb 
Stock"). (R. at 34, 203, 274). Reagan is presently the 
president and 80% shareholder of R.O.A. (R. at 34, 203, 274). 
The July 7, 1981 Agreement provided, among other things, that 
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R.O.A. had an option (the "Option") to purchase the Webb Stock at 
a price to be determined by independent appraisals. (R. at 62-
78). By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice of its 
exercise of the Option. (R. at 43, 78A, 207, 280, 484, 508). 
On April 20, 1987, Webb notified R.O.A. and Reagan that he was 
exercising his right pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to 
examine the books and records of R.O.A. to determine its 
financial condition, to verify the accuracy of its books and 
records, and to determine the approximate value of his stock 
prior to submitting it to an independent valuation. (R. at 53, 
485) . 
On or about May 5, 1987, Norman Clark, Vice-President 
of Administration and Finance of R.O.A., informed Webb that 
Reagan would be out of the country until May 18, 1987, and 
insisted that Webb defer his examination until May 18, 1987. (R. 
at 54, 485). On May 18, 1987, Webb renewed in writing his 
request to examine the books and records of R.O.A. (R. at 55-
56, 485, 514). By letter dated May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel 
notified Reagan that Webb's accountants would begin their 
examination at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, a regular 
business day, at R.O.A.'s corporate offices in Salt Lake City. 
(R. at 57, 93, 485). 
Webb's agents, certified public accountants with the 
accounting firm of Peat Marwick Main & Co., and Webb's counsel, 
Victoria E. Brieant, Esq., arrived at the offices of R.O.A. at 
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, to begin their inspection 
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and examination of the books and records. (R. at 93, 485-486). 
William H. Adams ("Adams")# corporate counsel for R.O.A., and 
Reagan refused to permit either Webb's counsel or Webb's 
accountants to inspect the books and records of R.O.A. that day. 
Although Webb's counsel reminded Adams that Webb had a statutory 
right to examine the books and records of R.O.A., Adams, Reagan 
and R.O.A. nevertheless refused to permit such an examination. 
(R. at 93-94). R.O.A.'s, Reagan's and Adam's refusal to permit 
Webb's inspection was confirmed by letter dated May 26, 1987, 
from Adams. (R. at 58, 94). 
On June 3, 1987, Webb repeated his demand to examine 
the books and records of R.O.A. Webb designated 10:00 a.m. on 
Friday, June 5, 1987, a regular business day, at R.O.A.'s 
corporate offices in Salt Lake City as the time and place for the 
examination. (R. at 59-60, 94, 485). On June 4, 1987, Webb's 
counsel telephoned Adams to determine whether R.O.A. would comply 
with Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and permit Webb to proceed with 
the examination. (R. at 95, 485-486). Among other things, 
Adams told Webb's counsel that Reagan and R.O.A. refused to allow 
the examination because it would allegedly disrupt its business 
and because there were no employees available to locate the 
company's files. (R. at 95). 
At 5:00 p.m. on June 4, 1987, Adams caused to be 
delivered to counsel for Webb a letter dated June 4, 1987, in 
which Adams stated that R.O.A. would not allow Webb, his agents 
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or attorneys to examine the books and records of R.O.A. until 
June 15, 1987. (R. at 61, 95-96). 
On June 15, 1987, the examination date specified by Adams, 
Webb's counsel and certified public accountants from Peat Marwick 
Main & Co. retained by Webb arrived at the corporate offices of 
R.O.A. at 9:00 a.m. to begin the examination. (R. at 96). At 
that time, Hall, R.O.A.'s in-house counsel, and Reagan refused to 
permit Webb's counsel and the accountants to examine the books 
and records of account of R.O.A. (R. at 96). Hall and Reagan 
informed Webb's counsel for the first time that it was their 
position that Webb was no longer a shareholder of R.O.A. because 
R.O.A. had exercised its option to purchase Webb's shares. (R. 
at 96). 
It is undisputed that Webb has not, within the two year 
period prior to this action, sold or offered for sale any list of 
shareholders of R.O.A. or any other corporation. He has not 
aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of shareholders 
for any such purpose. Webb has not improperly used any 
information secured through any prior examination of the books 
and records of account or minutes, or record of shareholders of 
such corporation or any other corporation, so as to provide 
R.O.A. and Reagan a defense pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 16-10-
47(c). (R. at 487). 
CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
Appellant Webb is unaware of any authority in Utah or 
elsewhere supporting the District Court's legal conclusion that 
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mere receipt by a stockholder of notice of exercise of an option 
to purchase his shares extinguishes his status and legal rights 
as a shareholder. Each jurisdiction that has confronted this 
issue has rejected the conclusion of the District Court and has 
ruled in favor of the position advanced by Webb. 
The instant case presents a case of first impression in 
Utah on this narrow and important issue. Given the large number 
of active closely held Utah corporations and the common usage of 
Stock Redemption Agreementsf Shareholder Buy/Sell Agreements and 
other stock option arrangements to order and govern shareholder 
relationships and to plan for the orderly disposition of closely 
held stock, the question of how and when a shareholder's status 
and rights under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47 are terminated 
deserves a definitive answer from Utah's highest court. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There are no disputed issues of material fact in this 
case. The District Court simply committed error in stating and 
applying the law to the undisputed facts. Appellant Webb seeks 
(i) a reversal of the District Court's order granting partial 
summary judgment in favor of R.O.A. and Reagan and denying Webb's 
motion for partial summary judgment and (ii) this Court's order 
directing the District Court to enter judgment in favor of Webb 
and against R.O.A., Reagan and Hall under Count II of Webb's 
Amended Complaint. 
It is well-settled that, with respect to questions of 
law, the Utah Supreme Court "is not bound by the conclusions of 
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the trial court and may determine the question." Olwell v. 
Clark. 658 P.2d 585, 587 n.l (Utah 1982). Generally, legal 
issues are entitled to the full breadth of appellate review. In 
Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 
1979), this Court stated, with respect to questions of law, that 
"the same deference need not be accorded the lower court's 
position as we would accord findings of fact." See Jeppson v. 
Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984) (Supreme Court will reverse 
trial court where it misapplies principal of law); Brigham v. 
Moon Lake Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 295-96, 470 P.2d 
393, 396 (1970) (Supreme Court may reverse for error of law). 
The Utah Supreme Court has the authority not only to 
vacate the decision of the District Court but also to direct the 
District Court to enter a judgment in favor of Webb. In a case 
procedurally similar to the instant case, this Court stated: 
[W]hen there are no issues of fact to be determined and the 
only dispute involves a question of law, we think this court 
has the duty and the power when a matter is before us to 
direct the lower court to enter a judgment according to the 
law of the case. . . . [W]e think the better procedure is 
for the court to grant the appropriate relief when there is 
no unresolved issue of any material fact to be determined. 
Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 200, 
443 P.2d 385, 389 (1968). See Clark v. Shelton. 584 P.2d 875, 
878 n.l (Utah 1978) ("[W]here, as in this case, the only issue is 
one of law, there is no reason to remand for further 
consideration."); Leithead v. American Colloid Co.P 721 P.2d 
1059, 1064 (Wyo. 1986) (in reversing summary judgment, the court 
may enter summary judgment in favor of appellant). Since no 
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disputed issues of material fact were presented in the summary 
judgment proceedings, Webb respectfully requests the Court not 
only to reverse the judgment of the District Court on the 
threshold issue of Webb's shareholder status, but to rule on the 
other determinative questions of law outlined in the section of 
this Brief entitled "Issues Presented For Review." Deciding all 
such questions of law in these proceedings will prevent further 
costly delays and proceedings before the District Court and 
potential additional proceedings before this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: A shareholder of record of a Utah corporation 
has a statutory right to examine the corporation's books and 
records. This right of examination is secured to the shareholder 
until he ceases to be a shareholder of record. A shareholder 
does not cease to be a shareholder of record until his shares are 
paid for and his stock is endorsed and transferred on the books 
and records of the corporation. Consequently, R.O.A.'s mere 
notice to Webb of its exercise of an option to purchase his 
R.O.A. stock did not terminate Webb's shareholder status or 
extinguish his statutory right of examination. 
POINT II; Whether a shareholder's stated purpose for 
examining a corporation's books and records is a "proper purpose" 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) is a question 
of law. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) is patterned after Delaware 
Code, Title 8, § 220(b)(1974); Delaware case law is therefore 
instructive on this issue. The Delaware Supreme Court has held 
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that determining the value of one's stock and ascertaining the 
propriety of certain business conducted by the corporation's 
officers are, as a matter of law, proper purposes for a 
shareholder's examination of the corporation's books and records. 
Webb's demand under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to examine 
R.O.A.'s books and records to determine the accuracy and 
integrity of the corporation's recordkeeping as well as the 
propriety of business conducted by the officers of R.O.A. and to 
ascertain the financial condition of R.O.A. and therefore the 
value of his stock is, as a matter of law, a proper purpose 
within the meaning of the statute. Finally, Webb's request to 
examine R.O.A.'s books and records during R.O.A.'s normal 
business hours was, as a matter of law, a request to examine such 
books and records at a reasonable time. 
POINT III; Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c) imposes 
against each corporation, and each of its officers and agents who 
violates Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), a penalty, in addition to 
other damages or remedies afforded by law, of 10% of the value of 
the shares owned by the shareholder (but not to exceed $5,000). 
Because Webb is a shareholder of record entitled to examine 
R.O.A.'s books and records, and because R.O.A. and Reagan, on 
more than one occasion, and Hall, on at least one occasion, have 
each violated that right, the statutory penalty is, as a matter 
of law, to be assessed against each of them with respect to each 
such occurrence. 
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
AS A SHAREHOLDER OF RECORD OF RtO.A., WEBB HAS AN 
ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF EXAMINATION, 
The pivotal question in the District Court's summary 
judgment proceeding was whether Webb ceased to be a shareholder 
of R.O.A. by virtue of R.O.A. #s notice of the exercise* of its 
option to purchase Webb's R.O.A. stock. In his motion for 
partial summary judgment, Webb sought to enforce his statutory 
right as a shareholder under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to 
examine R.O.A.'s books and records. In defense of its refusal to 
allow Webb's examination of its books and records, R.O.A. argued 
that upon Webb's receipt of R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of option 
to purchase his shares, Webb's shareholder status and rights were 
terminated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) defines "shareholder" as 
"one who is a holder of record of shares in a corporation." 
(emphasis added). The record indisputably shows that (i) the 
option purchase price for Webb's stock has never been determined; 
(ii) R.O.A. has tendered no consideration whatsoever to Webb for 
his stock; (iii) Webb has never endorsed his stock for transfer; 
and (iv) Webb has not delivered his stock to R.O.A. or any other 
purchaser. (R. at 484). 
The Utah Supreme Court observed in Goddard v. General 
Reduction & Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 186, 193 P. 1103, 1105 
(1920), that the "absolute right of inspection is limited . . . 
to those to whom the stock has been transferred on th€> books of 
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the company." As stated above, it is an uncontroverted fact that 
Webb has at all times pertinent to this action continued to be 
identified on the books of R.O.A. as a shareholder of record of 
R.O.A. (R. at 178-181). 
As further indisputable evidence of Webb's continuing 
status as a shareholder of R.O.A., Webb, of his own volition, and 
at R.O.A.'s request, pledged his R.O.A. stock to First Security 
Bank of Utah as security for a loan to R.O.A. approximately two 
months after R.O.A. exercised its option to purchase Webb's 
stock.1 (R. at 484). The uncontroverted fact that R.O.A. 
requested Webb to pledge his stock as security for R.O.A.'s First 
Security loan subsequent to the exercise of its option to 
purchase Webb's shares, (R. at 484), is wholly inconsistent with 
R.O.A.'s contention, as well as the District Court's ruling, that 
Webb ceased to be a shareholder of record as of the date R.O.A. 
exercised its option. 
Every court that has confronted this issue has held 
that a shareholder retains his status and statutory rights as a 
shareholder, despite being bound by contract to sell his shares 
to a third party, until the shares are paid for and transferred 
on the books of the corporation. In Estate of Bishop v. Antilles 
Enterprises. Inc., 252 F.2d 498, 499 (3rd Cir. 1958), the 
lrThis Court has held that the pledge of stock as security 
for a loan does not extinguish the shareholder's legal title to 
the stock. Morris v. Oqden State Bankr 84 Utah 127, 141, 28 P.2d 
138, 143-44 (1934) (title to pledged stock remains in pledgor 
until pledgee's lien is foreclosed); Gowans v. Rockport 
Irrigation Co., 77 Utah 198, 202, 293 P. 4, 6 (1930). 
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shareholders of the respondent corporation entered into a cross-
purchase agreement which provided that upon the death of 
shareholder Cory Bishop, the surviving shareholders had the 
option to purchase his shares from his estate at book value. 
Following Bishop's death, Vose, one of the surviving 
shareholders, asserted his right to purchase Bishop's stock from 
his estate, claiming the stock was worthless and tendering $1.00 
in payment. The administratrix of Bishop's estate argued 
successfully before the district court that the estate was 
entitled, as a shareholder, to examine the corporation's books 
and records. 
On appeal, the respondent corporation contended that 
"by virtue of the agreement between the stockholders, title to 
and ownership of Bishop's stock had passed to Vose immediately 
upon the election of the latter to purchase it." Id. (footnote 
omitted). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
corporation's argument and held that even though an option had 
been exercised to purchase the stock, which exercise "vested in 
Vose the right to have the stock transferred to him upon payment 
of the purchase price it did not divest the petitioner . . . of 
legal title to the shares or of the rights of a stockholder." 
Id. Moreover, the court concluded that even assuming the 
agreement to sell the stock was valid and binding, 
the petitioner's right . . . to have access to the 
books and records of the corporation certainly will 
continue at least until after the proper amount of the 
purchase price has been authoritatively determined and 
has been paid. Until then it is obvious that the 
petitioner has a very real interest in securing 
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accurate information as to the state of the respondent 
corporation' s accounts. 
Id. 
In Knaebel v. Heiner. 673 P.2d 885 (Alaska 1983), the 
Alaska Supreme Court rejected the argument that a shareholder who 
had executed a valid contract calling for the exchange of his 
stock prior to the date he demanded his right of inspection had 
no status as a shareholder for purposes of exercising his 
statutory right of inspection. Jeffrey Knaebel, a shareholder of 
Resource Associates of Alaska, Inc. ("RAA"), had entered into an 
agreement with RAA and the other two major shareholders of RAA to 
exchange his RAA stock for the stock of RAA's wholly owned 
subsidiary. Id. at 885-6. Heiner, RAA's records officer, 
refused Knaebel's written demand for inspection of the books and 
records of RAA pursuant to Alaska Stat. § 10.05.240# based on the 
argument "that if there was a valid contract for the exchange of 
stock in effect, which called for performance prior to the date 
of Knaebel's demand for inspection, Knaebel could have no right 
of inspection after that date." Id. at 886. 
In an action by Knaebel to enforce his right of 
inspection, the trial court agreed with Heiner and granted 
Heiner's motion for summary judgment. The Alaska Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's ruling on appeal, reasoning that 
although the exchange agreement did not specify the manner of the 
"exchange" of the stock, "some form of physical tender was 
contemplated, and . . . unless and until the exchange occurred, 
the agreement, at least on this point, . . . was executory." Id. 
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at 887 (footnotes omitted). The court concluded that there was 
no basis for the argument "that the agreement by itself 
effectively cancelled Knaebel/s shareholder of retcord status as 
of October 15, 1980, any more than a land sale contract which 
specifies a date for closing cancels a recorded deed on the 
specified date.11 Id. The court held that Knaebel, who, due to 
the executory status of the exchange agreement continued to be a 
shareholder of record, was therefore entitled by law to examine 
RAA's books and records. Id. at 888. 
In Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 130 Ga. App. 859, 204 
S.E.2d 810, 811 (1974), the Georgia Court of Appeals also 
concluded that a shareholder's execution of a contract with a 
third person for the sale of his stock, which contract remained 
executory, did not deprive the shareholder of his statutory right 
to inspect the corporation's books and records since the 
shareholder continued to be carried on the corporation's books as 
a shareholder of record. 
In Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co.. 199 Okla. 672, 189 
P.2d 929, 930 (1948), Hoover, the petitioner, sought a writ of 
mandamus compelling Fox Rig & Lumber Co. and others to permit his 
examination of the Fox Rig's books and records. The record 
before the trial court showed that the Articles of Incorporation 
of Fox Rig granted it the right of first refusal to purchase the 
stock of any shareholder attempting to sell his stock. The 
record also showed that Hoover had notified Fox Rig of his intent 
to sell his stock, that Fox Rig had duly exercised its option to 
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purchase the stock and, moreover, that Fox Rig had offered and 
tendered payment for the stock. Fox Rig made repeated demands 
upon Hoover for delivery of the stock which Hoover consistently 
rejected. Fox Rig argued, in defense to Hoover's petition for 
writ of mandamus, that "by reason of these facts the plaintiff is 
not in equity the owner of any stock in the defendant corporation 
and is not entitled to maintain this action." Id. at 931. The 
trial court denied Hoover's petition, concluding that due to the 
disputed question of stock ownership, Hoover did not show a clear 
legal right to the writ. Id. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
ruling, concluding that despite Fox Rig's valid exercise of its 
option to purchase the stock, "[w]hile plaintiff remained a 
shareholder of record, he had right of inspection, 
notwithstanding that defendant corporation may have an unexecuted 
contract to purchase the stock from plaintiff." Id. at 932. The 
Court observed, "The right to inspect is an incident of stock 
ownership. The right remains with the legal owner. The legal 
title to the stock in question remained in petitioner, Defendant 
Corporation claimed no more than an equitable right." Id. 
Summarizing the opinions of the courts that have 
addressed the precise issue presented in the instant case, the 
authors of Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations 
("Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations") wrote: 
A mere offer by the corporation to buy a stockholder's 
stock at a price fixed by the corporation does not 
affect their status. Similarly, a shareholders' 
reorganization agreement requiring the major 
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shareholders to exchange their stock for stock in 
another corporation does not by itself effectively 
cancel their status where the agreement remains 
executory until the actual exchange has occurred., 
Likewise, stockholders are not precluded from 
inspecting corporate books and records by reason of an 
executed contract for the sale of their stock in the 
corporation. Whether a contract to sell or exchange 
shares is deemed ultimately to be fully executed or 
executory at the time the shareholders demand 
inspection and whether the shareholders' names were 
ever removed from the books determines status, and 
hence whether the shareholders have a right of 
inspection pursuant to shareholder-of-record statutes. 
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2230 (perm, ed.) (footnotes omitted). 
The cases discussed above and Webb's case before this 
Court are indistinguishable. In each of the foregoing cases, as 
in the instant case, a shareholder bound by an executory contract 
to tender his shares upon receipt of payment for his shares 
sought to exercise his statutory right to examine the books and 
records of the corporation. In each case the court upheld the 
shareholder's statutory right of examination because the 
shareholder, not having received payment for and not having 
transferred title to his shares, continued to be a "shareholder 
of record." Each court concluded that the shareholder right of 
examination is an inseparable component of the legal ownership of 
stock. See, e.g., Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co,,, 189 P.2d at 
932. 
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan cited no cases in the 
summary judgment proceedings, nor are there any cases, supporting 
the District Court's ruling. The shareholder examination cases 
cited by R.O.A. in support of its argument that Webb's 
shareholder rights were terminated by R.O.A.'s notice of exercise 
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of its option are clearly distinguishable and inapposite since 
the shareholder in each of those cases had either (i) received 
payment for his shares and was subject to an action for specific 
performance, Dierkina v. Associated Book Service, Inc., 31 Misc. 
2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I960); (ii) endorsed 
his shares and delivered them to an escrow agent pending full 
payment of the price, Nash v. Gay Apparel Corp., 11 Misc. 2d 768, 
175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); (iii) sold and 
transferred the shares, although he attempted to retain a post-
sale right of inspection, Rosenberg v. Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 18 
Misc. 2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); or 
(iv) entered into a binding purchase/sale agreement with the 
purchasing corporation providing for installment payments secured 
by a chattel mortgage on the corporation's personalty, Tracy v. 
Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241, 243 
(1967) . 
There is also no merit to R.O.A.'s argument in the 
summary judgment proceedings that despite the absence of payment, 
endorsement and delivery an absolute sale of Webb's stock 
occurred upon R.O.A.'s notice of exercise. (R. at 151-153). 
R.O.A.'s argument that Webb's delivery of certificates was not 
essential to the passing of title since the sale was absolute and 
Webb was under a duty to transfer his stock, (R. at 152), not 
only begs the question but is wholly unsupported by the relevant 
case law. It is a well-settled principle of contract law that the 
exercise of an option to purchase stock does not constitute the 
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automatic purchase of the stock, but rather gives rise to an 
executory contract for the purchase thereof. Addressing the 
effect of the exercise of an option to purchase stock, the 
California Court of Appeals concluded in Glascock v. Sukumlyn, 
131 Cal. App. 2d 587, 281 P.2d 90, 93 (1955), that the optionee's 
exercise of the option does not automatically transfer the stock 
to him by operation of law, but rather creates a bilateral 
executory contract pursuant to which, for adequate consideration, 
the optionee agrees to buy and the optionor agrees to sell the 
subject stock. The court observed: 
[Options] are not binding agreements to sell the 
subject of the option—land, mines, livestock, 
merchandise, corporate stock. They are offers to sell 
on prescribed terms and there is no contract until the 
offer is accepted. When the latter occurs and the 
optionee complies with the express terms, the 
unilateral contract becomes bilateral. Upon payment of 
the price named in the option within the time 
specified, from that moment, the optionor no longer 
owns an interest in the optioned property, but is owner 
of only the property he received as consideration. 
Id. See also Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel, Inc., 133 N. J. 
Eq. 408, 30 A.2d 281, 286 (1943) (notice of unqualified 
acceptance of stock purchase option creates a bilateral executory 
contract of sale, but legal title to the stock remains in the 
vendor until the sale is consummated). 
Furthermore, in citing Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
Corporations for the proposition that payment is not necessarily 
essential to the passing of title, (R. at 152), R.O.A. omitted 
the remainder of the cited sentence: "but it may be so under the 
terms of the contract." Fletcher Cvc. Corp. § 5628 (perm. ed.). 
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The option agreement between R.O.A. and Webb provides that ff[i]n 
the event the stock is being purchased pursuant to the exercise 
of options under paragraphs 9 or 11, the purchase price shall be 
paid" (i) in cash, (ii) on an installment basis or (iii) pursuant 
to other terms agreed upon by the parties. (R. at 73) (emphasis 
added). The agreement further provides that ff[t]he stockholders 
shall retain all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation, 
except those specifically modified by this Agreement." (R. 
at 75). There is no provision in the agreement that upon 
exercise of its option, R.O.A. is, without payment to Webb, 
automatically vested with title to Webb's shares. Payment as 
specified in the option agreement is clearly a condition 
precedent to Webb's obligation to pass title. R.O.A.'s notice of 
exercise of its option to purchase Webb's stock did not deprive 
Webb of his ownership of the stock, nor will it do so until the 
consideration is paid and the sale is completed. R.O.A.'s 
arguments to the contrary are without merit. 
Based on (i) the unambiguous statutory definition of a 
"shareholder," (ii) the undisputed fact that Webb continues to be 
a "shareholder of record" on the books of R.O.A. and has never 
received payment for, endorsed or transferred his R.O.A. stock, 
and (iii) a line of unanimous decisions upholding Webb's 
shareholder right of inspection, Webb respectfully petitions the 
Court to summarily reverse the District Court's erroneous ruling 
and grant the further relief requested in this appeal. 
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POINT II 
WEBB REPEATEDLY MADE THE REQUISITE WRITTEN DEMAND 
STATING A REASONABLE TIME AND A PROPER PURPOSE FOR HIS 
SHAREHOLDER EXAMINATIONS, 
No one disputes the fact that the requisite written 
demands for shareholder examination were made by Webb*, (R. at 
3-4, 484-485). Whether these requested shareholder examinations 
were noticed for reasonable times and for a proper purpose is a 
question of law. Respondents' contention that W€>bb sought to 
examine R.O.A.'s books and records at unreasonable times is 
groundless. This Court held in Clawson v. Clayton. 33 Utah 266, 
272, 93 P. 729, 731 (1908), that normal business hours are 
"reasonable hours." See also Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2242 (perm, 
ed.) (reasonable time means normal business hours). Furthermore, 
after Webb's attorneys and accountants were repeatedly denied 
access on the normal business days and at the business hours 
specified in Webb's requests, R.O.A. designated, and Webb 
accepted, June 15, 1987 as the date on which Webb's examination 
could take place. (R. at 61, 95-96). Nevertheless, when Webb's 
agents appeared at the agreed upon time and place to conduct the 
examination, R.O.A. through Reagan and Hall again denied them 
access on the spurious grounds that Webb was no longer a 
shareholder of R.O.A. Given these facts, R.O.A. and Reagan 
cannot argue in good faith that Webb's requests were for 
unreasonable times. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), which is modeled after 
the Delaware statute, defines "proper purpose" as any "purpose 
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reasonably related to the person's interest as a shareholder." 
As a general rule, when one state borrows a statute from another 
state, the interpretations by the courts of the earlier enacting 
state are persuasive. Meyer v. Ford Industries. Inc., 272 Or. 
531, 538 P.2d 353, 356 (1975); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad, 233 Or. 
578, 379 P.2d 880, 883 (1963). The Delaware courts have held 
that a shareholder's proper purpose includes ascertaining whether 
the business of the corporation has been properly conducted, 
Nodana Petroleum Corp. v. State ex. rel. Brennan. 50 Del. 76, 123 
A.2d 243, 246 (1956), and determining the value of the 
shareholder's stock, CM & M Group Inc. v Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 
792-93 (Del. 1982) (valuation of shares in order to negotiate a 
fair sale of stock is a proper purpose for inspection); State ex. 
rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 31 Del. 570, 117 A. 122, 126 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1922). Delaware courts have also held that as 
long as a shareholder establishes one proper purpose for 
inspection, all other purposes are irrelevant. Skouras v. 
Admiralty Enterprises, Inc.f 386 A.2d 674, 678 (Del. Ch. 1978). 
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan contend that Webb has the 
appraisal process to determine the value of his shares and that 
no shareholder examination is necessary. Independant appraisers, 
however, will not act as Webb's agents and will not investigate, 
on Webb's behalf, any impropriety or irregularity with respect to 
business transacted, or R.O.A.'s recordkeeping and accounting 
practices. Respondents' attempt to characterize Webb's motives 
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as harrassing and vexatious is a further indication of 
Respondents' bad faith and is wholly unsupported by the record. 
The inviolability of statutory shareholder examination 
rights is demonstrated by a consistent line of cases holding that 
the fact that a shareholder may have other rights of access to 
corporate records, including discovery rights when engaged in 
litigation with the corporation, does not abrogate his statutory 
right to examination. See, e.g., Knaebel v. Heiner, 645 P.2d 
201, 204 (Alaska 1982) and cases cited therein. R.O.A. and 
Reagan simply cannot in good faith dispute that Webb's request 
was for a "reasonable purpose." 
POINT III 
WEBB IS ENTITLED. AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO AN AWARD OF 
STATUTORY PENALTIES AND ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO PERMIT ACCESS TO R.O.A.'& BOOKS 
AND RECORDS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c) provides that any officer 
or agent who, or corporation which, shall refuse to allow a 
properly demanded shareholder examination "shall be liable to 
such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of the value of the shares 
owned by such shareholder, in addition to any other damages or 
remedy afforded him by law; but no such penalty shall exceed 
$5,000." (emphasis added). Upon determination that R.O.A., 
Reagan and Hall have violated Section 16-10-47(c), the statutory 
penalty should be imposed as a matter of law. See ABA-ALI Model 
Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 52, % 2 (2d ed. 1971) (primary purpose of 
inspection legislation is to prescribe penalties so that 
corporations and officers will be less likely to refuse access 
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and "delay inspection until the right was actually litigated." 
(emphasis added)); see also. Naquin v. Air Engineered Systems & 
Services. Inc.. 423 So. 2d 713, 716-17 (La. 1983) (strict 
construction of penalty would render it meaningless); Meyer v. 
Ford Industries. Inc.. 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353, 359 (1975) 
(court could require penalty for each separate violation). 
Respondents have disputed the fact that the value of 
Webb's R.O.A. stock is greater than $50,000. Webb nevertheless 
requests this Court's ruling, as a matter of law, that Webb is 
entitled to an award of three statutory penalties in an amount to 
be determined at trial, against R.O.A., as a corporation, against 
Reagan, as an officer, and against Hall, as an agent of R.O.A. 
for refusing on three separate occasions, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c), to allow Webb, his agents and attorney, 
to examine and make extracts from R.O.A.'s books and records of 
account. 
CONCLUSION 
Webb has a right, as a matter of law, to examine the 
books and records of account of R.O.A. He is a shareholder of 
record and has made the requisite written demands to examine such 
records at reasonable times and for proper purposes. Because 
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan, as well as Hall, R.O.A.'s attorney 
and agent, have repeatedly refused to permit such examination, 
Webb is entitled, as a matter of law, to an award of statutory 
penalties against R.O.A., Reagan and Hall for each such refusal 
(in an amount yet to be determined by appraisal), as provided in 
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Utah Code Ann, § 16-10-47(c). Webb respectfully requests the 
Utah Supreme Court to reverse the District Court's order and to 
enter an order directing the District Court to grant Webb's 
motion for partial summary judgment (i) issuing an injunction 
pursuant to Rule 65A(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requiring R.O.A. to make its books and records 
available to Webb for shareholder examination; (ii) imposing the 
statutory penalties in amounts to be determined at trial for each 
past refusal to allow such examination; and (iii) granting such 
other and further relief as this Court may deem necessary and 
proper. 
Respectfully submitted this Z> day of December, 
1987. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
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1000 Kearns Building 
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-26-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief in the above 
referenced matter this 2- ?^day of December, 1987, by mailing 
the same, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Philip Fishier, Esq. 
Dennis M. Astill, Esq. 
Strong and Hanni 
Boston Building, 6th Floor 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Douglas T. Hall, Esq. 
1775 North 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-27-
ADDENDUM 
- 2 8 -
?/• *y /^^Uy^ -Zi^A. 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
DATE ?- ^ A y? 
JUDGE 
^-pf-fyA^^J?; 
Z— S'A? JZfsL-J'sJ-** ^F^r ^L^/^fl S<JL^^^> 
' * & • 
CUA 
/7. /$f£^Uy^J=> ^/^A^-T^ y^f-y / - ^ 
* & 
(<<~f/ / ^ *^J~tyf yZ-ys-y/ J2?S-JL<S-*S 
/Z/y&sJA '. /Z/J
 mJt*yjj£<*-^ Z?syy*^2^~zy /JLS -^^^y y^~ 
TO-lL^Ay^ * yO^JLA+UJ^ >ys y^yO, # 
fytr<^7 
Js^S &*-^,rt AZJLJ-J, ^  Jhl CyTt/^J^tJ ^> 72^ «. 
/ MS <^C^<Ly^rc^ 
-9- 'Zyy^, /cy£#s< y=&. S^yt^i CC-ILS -zsf-z^tj^^ o sS 
y ? / ^ 
7/cs/2^r*b ocyy>!. y*y- ~74J^4<P7 SS-r st^r s-s&fl. sO-, ^/yC^yTJ^c. <^LdL 
sd Md-2*ry^£/je^ #S?e<zy.^ s y /2y </^^ / Tltt^cY ^£&<Lyj-4y*r. *4L 
Jr7uyy ^yy-=> Jyju^ jr. ^y^^y-rJ ^-^cJ^C /^^^_y- *- ^y-
, i \( \ 
PAGE. / . OF. 
CLERK HON. 
JUDC 
REPORTER DATE: 
BAILIFF 
^t*-**/s-itP' « = ~ ^ 3 _ ^ ^ - r o J^ /L^-Zx^o yr^s-^/jU^> s ^ A^^U+J-t, 
r=7-
^ ^ 
